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Management control systems are developed to facilitate decentralized
decision-making while maintaining substantial goal congruence between the
decentralized units and the corporation as a whole. For the multinational
corporation, an international economy characterized by rapid currency changes
may introduce a serious element of distortion into its control system. Unless
systematically accounted for, currency changes may alter a foreign unit's
reported performance and lead to decision-making not congruent with corporate
objectives.
Our purpose in this note is to outline the basic elements of a control
system which will communicate, measure, and motivate operating results consis-
tent with home currency performance assuming optimal international funds
management. We will show that the nature of the control function in a
decentralized organization coupled with the advantages. of centralized
international funds management mandates a separation of the two functions.
Even so, extreme care must be taken so that the two activities will be
consistent with overall optimization.
Outline of Note
First we will give brief descriptions of some major characteristics of
the management control process and the financial management process and will
specifically discuss the international funds management task as part of the
latter process. After this we will propose a relationship between the financial
management and planning and control processes and develop a scheme which allows
for decentralized control but centralized international funds management, The
"linking pin" in this system is a set of specified "smart" budgeting rates.
We shall then discuss some problems and procedures for setting "smart" budgeting
rates; look further into how to use budgeting rates in the management control
process; and, finally, illustrate our approach by means of a numerical example.
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The Management Control Process
We have separated the management control process into two subprocesses.
1. determining a short-term strategy-set to be reflected in the budget.
2. tracking and diagnosing performance via reports indicating deviations
from the budget and the reasons for the deviations.
Determining The Budget: The budget determination process involves making
choices from a large number of business options that relate to operating
decisions in order to arrive at the best strategy for these decisions
(sales related decisions, resources related decisions, financial decisions,
etc.). Many business units attempt to initiate the narrowing down of these
options in a systematic way through long-range planning. The budget
determination process then narrows the options further into one best
budget. Other companies may not attempt to narrow their options through a
formal planning system, either because such a system is non-existent or
because the system is not (yet) entrusted with this task. In such instances
the burden of narrowing the options will fall entirely on the budgeting
process. These two approaches to narrowing the options, through planning
and budgeting vs. budgeting alone, are shown in Figure 1:
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Figure 1: Narrowing Strategic Option Through
Planning and Budgeting Vs Budgeting Only
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Tracking Performance: We turn to a discussion of some of the features
of the second part of the control process, namely the tracking and diagnosing of
actual performance relative to the budget. At predetermined intervals measures
are taken of the degree of fulfillment of the budgeted targets for each of
the key operating variables. Deviations from budgeted targets may lead the
control system to trigger one of three types of corrective actions:
- take no current action, but analyze the sources of the deviation
to provide added insight for next year's plan;
- correct the budgeted operating actions;
- or (particularly in cases of deviations due to fundamental changes
in assumptions included in the long-range plan) change the plan itself
and, consequently, also change the budget.
Assumptions
In this note we make several assumptions. We assume first that a formal
planning system exists and that there is consistency between the planning and
control systems.l Also, although a budget may be expressed in terms of mixed
numbers (i.e. not only in $ terms but also as non-$ figures as well as
qualitative statements), e shall restrict ourselves to $ numbqxs. We assume that
control process will be hierarchical reflecting several organizational
levels. This assumption results in a requirement for some form of
hierarchical and perhaps horizontal decomposition in order to. fit together
with pieces of the control process. However, we shall not explore the
development of a complete control system in detail, but merely discuss the
control of a foreign responsibility center relative to the domestic corporate
headquarters. The principles of control to be proposed can be put forward
more effectively within this simplified framework.
1
See Vancil and Lorange [13], Lorange and Scott Morton [6] for a discussion
of how to develop integrated planning and control systems.
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This general discussion of the control process thus far assumes that no
currency fluctuation problems exist. For the multinational corporation,
however, it is evident that operating decisions leading to a "smart" budget
as well as the tracking measurement of actual performance relative to the
budget will be influenced by currency considerations. We propose that control
of the international operations can be carried out in a way similar to the
one described above, provided the international funds management dimension
is controlled centrally and is reflected acurately in a set of planning rates.
The Financial Management Process
Operating parallel to the management-control process described is a
financial management process concerned with investment and long and short-term
financing decisions. It also emerges from the long-term planning process
and, as we shall see below, it interacts with the management control process
at a number of points.
The financial management process can be separated into long and short-
range components depending on the frequency with which decisions are reevalu-
ated. In the long-range component, strategic planning determines basic
business activities which, in turn, call for certain investment and financing
actions. In some cases, this investment and financing decision process feeds
back into strategic planning in order to iteratively improve the total plan.
In the multinational firm, this stage is complicated by the need to determine
the best possible international allocation of revenues and costs from the
viewpoint of tax minimization. This tax/profit planning process involves the
transfer of profits among units to reduce or postpone taxes-by manipulating
transfer, prices shifting the location of high margin activities, shifting the
incidence of fees and overheads, and by allocating the burden of financing
worldwide operations through intracompany accounts. This long-range component,
including tax and profit planning, will be undertaken annually, or when major
changes occur in the environment.
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The short-range component includes the management of cash and liquid
assets and short-term financing common to domestic and multinational firms
as well as foreign exchange management. We shall refer to this set of
activities as funds management. The decisions it entails are reconsidered
frequently in accordance with changes in the firms operations as well as in
the environment.
Although some of the variables in the tax and profit planning process
also appear in the funds management process, the two processes can be diff-
erentiated by the reversibility of the actions. For example, transfer prices
do shift profits and cash, but since it is unlikely that these can be varied
frequently due to operational or external constraints it becomes part of tax
and profit planning. Similarly, basic intracompany financing and remittance
policies are part of the longer range planning process, although the precise
timing of the funds flows can be adjusted and therefore included in the funds
management process.
Assuming that the long-term planning activities are being solved appro-
priately and that this is reflected in optimal transfer prices and after-tax
financing costs, the funds management problem is to minimize the expected cost
of financing the cash budget over the relevant planning period or maximize
profit for a given set of operating decisions given interest rate and exchange
rate forecasts and certain constraints on foreign exchange risk exposure or,
in more sophisticated formulations, to define efficient risk-cost solutions.2'3
2
Examples of formal solutions to the funds management problem include Lietaer [5],
Rutenberg [8], and Shapiro [10]. Scott [9] provides a concise description of the
key elements in this process.
3
Shulman [11] discusses operational constraints on transfer price manipulation.
These constraints coupled with restrictions imposed by tax authorities suggest
to us that transfer price manipulation should be considered part of the long-
range tax/profit planning process and not part of the short-term funds manage-
ment process as suggested by Rutenberg.
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The primary solution variables are borrowing or lending in different
currencies for periods of the same or different maturities, shifting funds
through leading or lagging intracompany payables, timing funds remittances,
and entering into forward exchange contracts. In addition to the cash budget
and forecasts of interest and exchange rates, information will be required on
external constraints limiting specific transactions (i.e. maximum acceleration
of spot foreign exchange transfers due to leading and lagging intracompnay
accounts, maximum borrowing in different currencies and markets, etc.) which
in turn may be linked to certain company variables. If risk aversion is in-
troduced into the problem, further information about the firm's operations,
monetary assets and liabilities, and investment opportunities is required.
In order to solve the funds management problem so as to hedge against
exchange fluctuations, the impact of these fluctuations on the value of the
firm must be estimated and incorporated in the solution procedure.4
Whether the funds management function seeks to profit from international
capital market imperfections, such as nationally segmented markets separated
by restrictions on certain types of capital transactions, or whether it merely
seeks to limit risks due to exchange rate fluctuations, it should be readily
apparent that maximum effectiveness requires treating the entire multinational
corporation as a single unit.5
It is interesting to note that the funds management function makes no
distinction between "normal" financing, hedging, or speculation. For
example, taking advantage of interest differentials in the financing
of total corporate cash needs might be viewed as "normal" financing,
whereas further borrowing in one currency for lending in another
would be speculation. Typical solution procedures would not distinguish
between the two and would exploit international disequilibria to the
extent allowed by internal or external constraints. For example, the
model employed by Robbins and Stobaugh [7], makes no distinctions of
this type.
Robbins and Stobaugh [7] provide extensive examples and analyses supporting
this statement although they find that the largest corporations have backed
off from complete centralization of this function. This may be due to the
difficulties of coordinating it with the management control process.
- 7 -
The Relationship Between The Control And Financial Management Process
Up to this point we have proceeded as if the control and financial
management processes are parallel, but essentially independent. However, it
should be readily apparent that there are a number of interdependencies between
the two. In particular, operating decisions, which require assigning values
to different currencies to be received or paid out at different points in time,
must be linked very closely to the funds management process which determines
these values. Further, the operating plans themselves should take into
account likely movements in the relative values of different currencies.
Limiting our discussion to the current or tactical aspects of the two processes,
it should be clear that,ideally, operating decisions (selling, pricing, setting
sales terms, etc.) should be made simultaneously with funds management decisions.
The solution to the funds management problem determines the value of additional
6
revenues or costs in various currencies at different points in time. On the
other hand, its solution requires as an input a complete schedule of receipts
and expenditures which are the results of the operating decisions. This
simultaneous process is illustrated in Figure 2.
Setting The Budget / Funds Management Decisions 
Tracking Performance / Incorporating Currency Effects
$ Results
Figure 2: A Simultaneous System For Carrying Out The
Financial Management As Well As The Planning and Control Tasks
6 Jaaskelainen and Salmi [4] provide a joint linear programming
solution of the two in a single two country, one product context.
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Unfortunately, this type of system requires operating managers to
consider the entire range of financial transactions which would determine the
value of the marginal foreign currency transaction. This implies that a
centralized decision-making office should exist and be responsible for deciding
on these two classes of problems simultaneously. However, for valid operating
reasons, most real-world multinational corporations are highly decentralized;
and they must, therefore, rely on mechanisms for decentralized decision-
making. We wish to provide a system which separates these two functions and
yet comes close to an overall optimum. A decomposed system might appear
as follows:
shadow prices for
currency/time options
Setting the budget J - ._ Funds management decisions
isolation of currency effects
Tracking performance - | Currency effect
$ results
Figure 3: A Decomposed System For Carrying Out The
Financial Management As Well As The Planning And Control Tasks
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In Figure 4 we illustrate a process model integrating the planning
and control processes with the financial management processes and indicate
how the steps of the two processes might interact. This separation is very
similar to what actually occurs in firms with sophisticated domestic short-
term funds management frameworks. Although the Treasurer's office may engage
in numerous alternative financing operations, operating managers can be
provided with a single time-value figure (discount rate) relating cash flows
occurring at different points in time. Note the (?) on the arrow linking
funds management to operating plans as well as on the one linking funds
management and current operating decisions. They reflect the lack, in
practice, of such linkages, linkages which we feel are extremely important
when attempting to employ a system featuring decentralized control and cen-
tralized funds management.
The problem, then, in order to allow for a decentraJized planning and
control process, is to define a set of shadow prices for flows in various
currencies at different points in time which will provide links at these
critical points. We shall refer to these rates as "smart" budgeting rates.
Determining And Using "Smart" Budgeting Rates In The Control Process
The desired set of rates will reflect the firm's estimates of exchange
rates and interest rates, its receipts and disbursements over time, and its
ability to shift funds from one currency to another. The difficulty,of course,
lies in the requirement for a schedule of receipts and disbursements prior
to their determination that reflects the simultaneous nature of the problem. This
problem might be resolved by formally decomposing the overall problem as part
of a mathematical programming approach. However, we consider the most realistic
method to be the use of one or more iterations between the two related problems.
1Financial Management
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Beginning with a set of forecasts of trends in the value of various currencies
relative to the central currency, operating managers could prepare rough,
highly aggregated sets of operating plans for different units. These, in turn,
would serve as input for a first solution of the centralized funds management
problem. The resulting budgeting rates or foreign exchange future shadow rates
could, in turn, be used to produce a final set of operating plans and budgeting
rates to guide subsequent decisions. Only in extreme cases should further
iterations be required.
In the case of firms willing to operate in terms of expected results,
the budgeting rates would primarily reflect expected rates of change in
foreign exchange rates over time. Budgeting rates for firms wishing to
hedge against exchange rate risks would incorporate additional discounts
or premiums relative to the expected future values of the various currencies.
These two alternative approaches to determining budgeting rates are
illustrated with a simple example. Assume that the current exchange
rate between the foreign local currency (LC) and the home currency is .1
to 1 and that there are two equally likely possibilities for the next period,
.0833 to 1, and the same rate, .1 to 1, giving an expected rate of .09167 to
1. Further, assume that there is a forward foreign exchange market and
the one period forward rate is .09 to 1. If the firm requires no risk-premium
for bearing foreign exchange fluctuations, then the expected rate of .09167
to 1 will be the appropriate "smart" rate. On the other hand, depending
on its degree of risk aversion, which would undoubtedly be related to the
magnitude of the impact of fluctuations of the LC:$ exchange rate on the firm,
the rate would be closer to the "locked-in" or certain future rate provided
by the forward contract.
All computations are done in terms of the LC:$ rate since it is the ratio
used to translate results into $.
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In reality, the firm might not be able to cover exchange risks fully
through forward markets but would have other channels open to it, including
LC borrowing. Again, constraints on aggregate foreign exchange risk exposure
or a formal set of risk-cost tradeoffs would determine the position of the
budgeting rate on the continuum between the expected future exchange rate
and the "locked-in" certain rates provided by forward exchange contracts
or local borrowing.
Of course, the problem of forecasting exchange rates still remains. But
such forecasts are required for optimal operating and financial decisions
regardless of the type of control process employed and, therefore, they
are not an incremental requirement of the proposed system.
Because the set of "smart" budgeting rates incorporates the firm's best
estimates of the value to the firm of future flows in various currencies, they
are the best possible basis for operating decisions as well as the ideal
benchmark for use in the control process. Furthermore, they go a long way
toward resolving one of the major problems in multinational management control;
the treatment of variations in measured results due to currency fluctuations.
To impose the entire effect of exchange rate fluctuations on operating
managers implies responsibility without control and introduces noise into
the control system. On the other hand, to entirely remove these effects
surely can lead to inappropriate operating decisions since managers are not
penalized for ignoring foreseeable exchange rate shifts. With appropriate
budgeting rates, managers could be responsible for home currency performance
computed at the budgeting rates, thus motivating appropriate decisions while
not introducing uncertainty that can be dealt with better in the centralized
finance function.
J
____1__ _1-·-111.-- 1--1__
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This system of going through a prior best judgement activity to set the
"smart" currency rate for a given point in the future which then will be the
basis for decision-making and performance evaluation satisfies the two major
criteria for a good management control system, goal-congruence and fairness.
Goal congruence is restored because a corporate-wide point of view has been
brought to bear on the local currency rate, eliminating decision-making efforts
taken on the basis of the expectations and risk-preferences of local managers
who necessarily will have a narrower horizon on the currency risk problem
than the corporate headquarters. Fairness is restored because of the es-
tablishment of a reasonably objective standard against which performance
might be measured, so that the local decision-maker gets no blame or credit
for currency fluctuations totally outside his control. A common source
of friction today is the imposition from corporate headquarters on a sub-
sidiary of financial policies which result from a world-wide funds manage-
ment process. To the extent that the relative performance of subsidiaries
is altered by these policies, they represent a major source of bias and
friction in the control process. The present system ties performance evalua-
tion to the "smart" budget rate and thus separates operating results from
the centralized funds management function.
A Practical Illustration
In order to illustrate the effects of alternative treatments of currency
fluctuations in terms of providing signals and incentives for operating
managers, we assume a possible devaluation of the local currency of the
subsidiary relative to the home currency of the parent with possible outcomes
similar to the example given in the previous section.9 In this example
8For example, see Shulman [5
For example, see Shulman [5]
This section draws on Tan [12]
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we assume that the expected LC:$ rate, .09167 to 1 is the appropriate "smart"
budgeting rate.
The manager faces three possible transactions which are not mutually
exclusive. This example is complex, since the $ profit computations involve
asset adjustments as well as operating profits. We shall assume that the
accounting data of a foreign responsibility center are translated from local
currency into the parent company's currency according to the monetary/non-
monetary method.1 0
Three operating plans are considered. One involves sales of LC 80,000
and requires LC 75,000 of exposed assets, the second gives sales of LC
100,000 but requires LC 100,000 of the exposed assets and the third gives
sales of LC 150,000 but requires LC 200,000 of exposed assets. The remaining
details of each plan, as well as their budgeted performance using each of
the possible exchange rates are shown in Table 1. Note that for simplicity,
we assume changes in the exchange rate would have no impact on LC operating
results.
10
The four foreign currency translation methods in use or being advocated
are:
- the current/non-current method
- the monetary/non-monetary method
- the temporal method
- the current rate method
Each are discussed in detail in AICPA [1. We are not advocating any
particular method, although we do believe the monetary/non-monetary
method is the most sensible of the two methods in regular use.
"Under this method, monetary assets and liabilities are translated at
the current exchange rate. Monetary assets and liabilities are defined
as items which represent the right to receive (or the obligation to pay)
a fixed number of foreign currency units (cash, accounts receivable,
accounts payable, borrowed funds, etc.). Nou*monetary assets and liabili-
ties are translated at the exchange rate which prevailed at the date of
acquisition or commitment." Barrett [2], p. 5.
I 
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Table 1
BUDGETED PROFIT PERFORMANCE AT DIFFERENT EXCHANGE RATES
Budget
in LC terms
Operating Plan A Operating Plan B Operating Plan C
Sales LC 80,000
COGS LC 60,000
OPX LC 4,000
Profit LC 16,000
LC 100,000
LC 80,000
LC 5,000
LC 15,000
LC 150,000
LC 125,000
LC 7,500
LC 17,500
(taxes ignored for simplicity)
Budgeted Margin + 20%
at existing LC.1: $ rate
Sales
COGS
OPX
$8,000
$6,000
$ 400
Profit $1,600
Budgeted Margin +20%
at "budgeting rate" LC .09167: $1
Sales $7,332
COGS $5,499
OPX $ 367
*Loss $ 626
on exposed
assets
Profit $ 840
Budgeted Margin + 11.5%
at 12.1 rate (if budget contingent on actual outcome)
Sales $6,664
COGS
OPX
$4,998
$ 333
X Loss $1,250
Profit $ 83
Budgeted Margin 1.2%
+15% +11.7%
$10,000
$ 8,000
$ 500
$ 1,500
$15,000
$12,500
750
+15%
$ 1,750
+11.7%
$ 9,166
$ 7,333
$ 458
$ 834
$13,749
$11,457
$ 687
$ 1,688
$ 541
+5.8%
$ -67
-.5%
$ 8,333
$ 6,667
$ 417
$ 1,667
$ -418
$12,500
$10,417
$ 625
$ 3,334
$-1,876
-5.0%
Exposed assets, with monetary/non monetary distinction, are the excess of cash
and LC receivables and other financial assets over all forms of LC obligations.
Assume LC 75,000 for Plan A = LC 100,000 for Plan B, LC 200,000 for Plan C..
-15%
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It is easy to see how the treatment of foreign exchange fluctuations will
affect a manager's reported profit and therefore his incentives. If foreign
exchange fluctuations are considered to be outside of the realm of the
operating manager, the results will be recorded as if the ending exchange
rate is 1:1 (or a similar effect will be obtained by altering the budgeting
performance standard to reflect the actual outcome) and all three transactions
will be profitable, including C which clearly should be avoided. If all
exchange fluctuations are imposed on the manager, on the other hand, he will
probably avoid B as well as C, because of the possibility of a loss. Only if the
manager's reported profit is based on the budgeting rate , in this case
the expected rate .09167:1, will he make appropriate decisions--namely,
accepting A and B and avoiding C. In this fashion, he would be held re-
sponsible for decisions consistent with the best available forecast of exchange
rates, but would not be penalized for further fluctuations (or rewarded if
these did not take place).
Let us now turn to the question of what exchange rate should be used when
tracking actual performance, given that one of the three exchange rate
types has been chosen for budget preparation.
The various budget-rate/tracking-rate combinations are illustrated in
Table 2. Combinations marked N.A. are judged to be inefficient because they
involve more effort than other options which are clearly superior and
therefore are not considered. Note that all combinations along the diagonal,
i.e., where both budgeting and tracking use the same type of rates, produce
no deviations due to exchange rate variations. However, they do have quite
different implications in terms of the budgeting process itself. Both historical
rate and actual rate budgets, the latter requiring a budget adjustment for
every exchange rate change, ignore the possible impacts of exchange rates
___1_1__·__lll___a___ _ls_·11__11_________ _ _ __ j __ s____·____ 
I
- 17 -
Table 2
BUDGET VS "TRACKING" PERFORMANCE OF PROFITS EXAMPLE WITH ALTERNATIVE METHODS
te used for Actual Rate Historical Rate Budgeting Rate
anslation/
racking"
Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
10:1 12:1 10:1 12:1 10:1 12:1
Actual LC.1:$1 or LC.0833:$l
Plan A Profit 1,600 83
Budget 1,600 83 N.A. N.A.
Deviation
Plan B Profit 1,500 -418 N.A. N.A.
Budget 1,500 -418
Deviation
Plan C Profit 1,750 -1876
Budget 1,750 -1876 N.A. N.A.
Deviation
Historical LC.1:$1
Plan A Profit 1,600 83 1,600 ' 1,600 N.A.
Budget 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Deviation
Plan B Profit 1,500 -418 1,500 1,500
BudgetBudget n1,500 1,500 1 500 1,500 N.A.
Deviation -1 ..
-1,919
Plan C Profit 1,750 -1,876 1,750 1,750
Budget 1,750 1,750 -1,750 1,750 N.A.
Deviation -3,626
Budgeting LC.09167:$1
Plan A Profit 1,600 83 840 83
Budget 840 840 N.A. 840 83
Deviation +760 -757
Plan B Profit 1,500 -418 541 -418
Budget 541 541 541 -418
Deviation +959 -959 NA.
Plan C Profit 1,750 -1876 -67 -1876
Budget 67 -67 N.A. -67 -1876
Deviation +1813 -1813
]
III
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on the firm and therefore, make plan C appear acceptable. The "smart"
budgeting rate diagonal combination, o the other hand, isolates managers
from unplanned exchange fluctuations but acknowledges the impact of the
anticipated fluctuations at the budgeting stage.
The combination of historical rates for budgeting and actual rates for
tracking appears to represent the worst of all worlds, although it probably
is widely used. The budgeting process takes no account of possible exchange
fluctuations, yet their full impact is attributed to the manager at the
tracking stage. The harmful effects of such a system can be expected to include
padding of budgets or decentralized hedging actions by managers to reduce
exchange risks which loem very large from their local perspective, and
numerous sources of noise and bias in tracking comparisons. The one
remaining combination, "smart" budgeting rates with tracking at the actual
rate, imposes foreign exchange related income fluctuations on the operating
manager, but at least it forces their consideration at the budgeting stage.
It thus seems clear that, (a) a "smart" budgetary rate is superior to other
alternatives, and that, (b) tracking rate matching the budget rate appears
to be the best.
Some Implementation Issues
The mechanics of determining the "smart" budgeting rates become signifi-
cant. Who should set the rates? The most important consideration here should
be to incorporate all relevant information available from inside and outside
sources.
i __ __I_
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An honored convention for minimizing disfunctionalities in control
systems is that affected management should have a say in the negotiation
of any performance budget relevant to his own unit. This is to ensure a
thorough understanding of the reasonableness of a budget is achieved, and,
consequently, to enhance confidence and commitment to the system. This
implies that local management must agree on the "smart" budget rates and feel
comfortable about them. Typically outside as well as headquarter currency
experts will have a major influence on the rate determination. The local
manager must, however, be heard.
Two mechanisms should be instituted in order to improve confidence in
the system:
- a mechanism for appealing unacceptable "smart" budgeting rates to
a higher level of management.
- a mechanism for revising the "smart" budgeting rates in those
circumstances where completely unforeseen events dramatically change
the exchange rate.
We have avoided the question of whether the budgeting rates should
be adjusted continuously or periodically. However, just as with any other
plan or budget, these rates can be revised to reflect major shifts in the
financial environment.
Conclusions
We have developed an approach for a class of the multinational corpora-
tion's decision support systems which incorporates management control over
operating decisions,undertaken fairly autonomously by each individual foreign
subsidiary, and international funds management undertaken primarily by a
- 2q-
headquarters office. A set of currency rates which reflect the best judgement
of the currency developments by those involved, called "smart" budgeting
rates, were developed to be the basis for the budgets. Local management
were expected to take actions on the basis of these rates and to be held
responsible for their performances relative to these rates. We feel this
approach offers an operational mechanism to effectively cope with the foriegn
currency fluctuation problem while maintaining a decentralized management
control system.
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